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3 
The efficiency implications of financial 
conglomeration 






This paper studies the competitive and efficiency implications of financial 
conglomeration driven by cost-efficiency gains in monitoring credit and insurance 
customers. The analysis shows that conglomeration is conducive to tougher 
competition in the credit market and increases profit in insurance. The aggregate 
profit in the financial sector does not increase, because the conglomerates pass the 
cost-efficiency gains on to the borrowers in full. More competitive market for 
financial services also reduces the aggregate risk in the financial markets, 
indicating that capital requirements in both sectors should be lower in the 
presence of financial conglomerates 
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4 
Finanssiryhmittymien vaikutus rahoitusmarkkinoiden 
tehokkuuteen 






Tässä tutkimuksessa tarkastellaan finanssiryhmittymien vaikutusta rahoitusmark-
kinoiden kilpailullisuuteen ja tehokkuuteen. Analyysi osoittaa ryhmittymien muo-
dostumisen lisäävän lainamarkkinoiden kilpailua ja vakuutusmarkkinoiden voitto-
ja. Rahoitusmarkkinoiden kokonaisvoitot eivät kuitenkaan kasva, vaikka ryhmit-
tymien asiakkaiden monitoroinnista koituvat kustannukset supistuvat, koska 
kustannusten pieneneminen välittyy suoraan laina-asiakkaille. Pankkisektorin kil-
pailun lisääntyminen ja vakuutusmarkkinoiden kustannusten supistuminen lisää-
vät finanssiryhmittymien monitorointia ja siten rahoitusmarkkinoiden stabiilisuut-
ta. Tästä syystä rahoitusmarkkinoiden vakavaraisuusvaatimuksia voidaan lieven-
tää sekä pankki- että vakuutussektorilla, jos näitä rahoituspalveluja myydään 
ainoastaan finanssiryhmittymissä. 
 
Avainsanat: finanssiryhmittymät, pankkitoiminta, vakuutustoiminta, vakavarai-
suusvaatimukset 
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Many countries have been reforming their ﬁnancial systems over the past two
decades. These reforms have involved a removal of limitations on the activities
of ﬁnancial institutions. These developments have led to the emergence of the
so-called ﬁnancial conglomerates which combine several ﬁnancial services in
one organization. Advocates of ﬁnancial conglomeration have claimed that
the new organizational arrangements will generate signiﬁcant beneﬁts on both
sides of the markets. Included among these are cost-eﬃciency gains and
higher proﬁtability, resulting from economies of scale and scope; increased
market eﬃciency which makes the market less vulnerable to costly failures; and
greater convenience on the customer side of the market as a result of ‘one-stop
shopping’ beneﬁts and information advantages generated by long-term business
relationships.1
One incentive for the banks to expand their product lines is the ability to
serve new customers and sell additional products to the existing ones, giving
the banks an opportunity to exploit economies of scope and scale. For instance,
an institution combining several services under one roof can improve its cost
eﬃciency by using the same distribution channels and customer databases for
several services. Provided that these cost-eﬃciency gains will be, at least
partially, passed on to the customers, ﬁnancial conglomeration may well lead
to more eﬃcient ﬁnancial markets with more aﬀordable ﬁnancial services.
While this is arguably one presumption the regulators have used to justify
the removal of restrictions in ﬁnancial markets, the question whether ﬁnancial
conglomeration leads to more eﬃcient markets, however, depends essentially
on the market environment which provides the incentives for prudential and
competitive behavior.2
In this paper we consider the competitive implications of allowing more
ﬁnancial activities to occur in a ﬁnancial institution and examine the
circumstances where it will improve the market eﬃciency in terms of pricing
and the management of risks. To this end, we develop an example of a
ﬁnancial conglomerate combining banking and insurance services. The model
combines features from the literature on industrial organization and ﬁnancial
intermediation. In particular, we consider markets for ﬁnancial contracts in
the presence of moral hazard. In modeling the optimal design of contracts we
build on Holmström and Tirole (1997) as the institutions have an access to an
interim monitoring technology which can be used to observe the hidden action.
We depart from Holmström and Tirole (1997) in that ﬁnancial institutions
are specialized in monitoring diﬀerent clients as the monitoring costs are
determined by the speciﬁc types of the clients. The diﬀerence in costs thus
determines the conditions under which the banks can feasibly act as delegated
1For general discussion on the risks and regulatory aspects associated with ﬁnancial
conglomerates, see Mälkönen (2004) and Morrison (2003).
2For instance, one purpose of the repeal of Glass-Steagall act (1933) which limited the
ﬁnancial institutions activities (Gramm-Leach-Bliley act 1999) was ‘to enhance competition
in the ﬁnancial services industry by providing a prudential framework for the aﬃliation of
banks, securities ﬁrms, and other ﬁnancial service providers, and for other purposes.’
7monitors to investors (Diamond 1984) and whether the degree of competition
on the markets aﬀects the allocation of risk within the economy.
The key assumption is that ﬁnancial conglomerates have an informational
advantage in monitoring clients which have an established credit relationship
with the institution.3 This gives the institution a local monopoly power over
these clients when they shop for an insurance contract to secure their future
income. The immediate consequence of this eﬀect is that the credit market
becomes more competitive, because the ﬁnancial institutions engage in a
ﬁerce competition for the long-term client relationship. Increased competition
in banking imposes downward pressure on interest rates in banking and in
equilibrium the conglomerates pass the cost eﬃciency gains in insurance on to
the banking customers in full, indicating that ﬁnancial conglomeration does
not increase the aggregate proﬁt in the ﬁnancial industry.
The example might be useful in understanding why some argue that the
ﬁnancial conglomerates are unlikely to achieve the expected beneﬁts. For
instance, ﬁve big international banks — J.P. Morgan Chase, Citigroup, Credit
Suisse, Deutche Bank, and UBS — have been primarily unsuccessful in pursuing
to capitalize on the synergies.4 On the basis of the results reported in this study
it might be that although the institutions perceive signiﬁcant gains associated
with oﬀering broader set of ﬁnancial services ex-ante, the attempts to capitalize
on the clients’ downstream business leads to a market equilibrium in which the
anticipated revenues will not be realized ex-post.
From a welfare point of view the model illustrates that conglomeration
enhances the eﬃciency in the ﬁnancial markets in the following sense. First,
in equilibrium the ﬁnancial conglomerates pass the cost-eﬃciency gains in
insurance on to the banking customers in full, regardless of the degree
of competition between the institutions. Second, ﬁnancial conglomeration
reduces the share of riskier loans in the market, because the institutions’
have increased incentives to monitor the borrowers as it gives them a
competitive advantage in the market for ﬁnancial services. Finally, increased
market eﬃciency in both pricing and risk management makes the capital
adequacy regulation more eﬀective in the case of ﬁnancial conglomerates
than stand-alone institutions. Therefore, we conclude that the regulator can
implement equilibrium with the same allocation of risk in the ﬁnancial markets
with lower capital adequacy requirements.
3For instance, when a bank or an insurer establishes a relationship with a client, it
incurs costs in gathering information about the client. An institution that combines
these services can reduce these costs by using a common information system and reusing
gathered information. Jappelli and Pagano (2002) use cross-country data and show that
information-sharing diminishes the adverse selection problem inherent in credit-relationships
and reduces the default rate in credit market. Mester, Nakamura and Renault (2002)
ﬁnd empirical support for the argument that information gathered from diﬀerent ﬁnancial
services gives an advantage for institutions that combine these services over other lending
institutions. Vander Vennet (2002) provides similar evidence in the case of European
ﬁnancial conglomerates and establishes that they have an information advantage over
specialized institutions and conglomeration is contribution to a more eﬃcient ﬁnancial
system.
4Empirical studies examining the cost-eﬃciency gains and one-stop shopping beneﬁts
also report mixed results about the proﬁtability of ﬁnancial conglomeration. See eg Berger
(2000).
8The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section
describes the economic environment in banking and insurance business. The
third and the fourth sections examine the insurance and credit market
equilibria when the institutions’ product lines are limited to include only
one service. Section ﬁve repeats these exercises in the presence ﬁnancial
conglomerates and compares the results. Section six concludes.
2T h e m o d e l
We consider a risk neutral economy consisting of agents who live for three
periods and ﬁnancial institutions oﬀering credit and insurance services. At
the beginning of period one, the agents lack capital, but they are endowed
with a technology which combined with one unit of capital yields a stochastic
payoﬀ. The banks enter the market as the only source of ﬁnance and oﬀer loan
contracts to the agents. With the help of bank credit the borrowers start a
project which yields a stochastic income at the end of the ﬁrst and the second
period. Other assumptions concerning the credit markets are as follows:
C1) Assets and risks: Banks oﬀer a standard debt contracts to the
borrowers. The amount of capital required for a start-up project is
normalized to unity and the borrowers’ debt service obligation to bank
i is denoted by ri. The banks face a perfectly elastic supply of funds at
a gross interest rate ρs > 1. The projects yield a stochastic payoﬀ equal
to ρr when successful. In the case of project failure, the payoﬀ is zero.
The borrowers are protected by limited liability, thus, the borrower with
a successful project will repay the bank in full, but in the case of failure,
the bank receives nothing.
The outcome of the project depends on two stochastic components.
The success of the project is aﬀected by an unobservable eﬀort
undertaken by the borrowers α =¯ α,α. If a borrower chooses an eﬀort
level ¯ α, her project succeeds idiosyncratically with probability π(¯ α) < 1,
regardless of the state of the world. The failure probability π(¯ α) is
non-correlated between borrowers.
With an eﬀort level α the project survives idiosyncratically with
probability π(α) in a high-income state of the world. The high-income
state of the world occurs with probability ω, thus, the individual success
probability of a project with eﬀort level α is π(α)ω. Under low-income
state of the world all projects with eﬀort level α fail with probability
(1−ω), contributing to a system wide risk of loan losses, when the number
of low-eﬀort projects is high. In what follows ¯ π = π(¯ α) and π = π(α)ω
will be used as a shorthand for the individual success probabilities,
9when the borrower chooses an eﬀort level ¯ α and α, respectively. The
probability that each project with eﬀort α will fail is given by 1 − ω.5
C2) Moral hazard: The modeling of moral hazard follows Holmström and
Tirole (1997). A borrower enjoys a private beneﬁt B>0 from choosing
α rather than ¯ α. The loan contract is therefore subject to a moral hazard
problem, because for a given interest rate r a bank cannot implement an
eﬀort ¯ α, unless it observes the borrowers’ eﬀort level and condition the
loan contract on this information. This can be formalized as
π(ρr − r)+B ≥ ¯ π(ρr − r). (2.1)
which indicates that when the eﬀort level cannot be veriﬁed and the
borrower is oﬀered the same interest rate, she will choose action α.6
C3) Monitoring technology and borrower-types: We employ an
information based model of imperfectly competitive spatial banking
system to describe the banks’ monitoring behavior. The modeling is
based on Diamond’s (1984) model of delegated monitoring and Salop’s
(1979) model of spatial competition. The model considers banks oﬀering
loan-contracts to each client y separately and the banks engage in interim
monitoring of the clients as in Holmström and Tirole (1997).
Banks are specialized in the sense that their monitoring costs depend
on the type of the potential clients’ start-up project.7 More speciﬁcally,
the borrowers are uniformly distributed on a circle with a two unit
circumference and density M. The distribution determines the projects
in terms monitoring costs. To monitor a project of a borrower located
at 0 <y<1, a bank located at position 1 incurs a monitoring cost
equal to x1tB,w h e r etB denotes the cost parameter which is identical to
all banks and x1 =1 − y denotes the distance in the ’technological
circumference’ between the applicant’s project and the one that the
bank is fully specialized in monitoring.8 In what follows we will use
the distance parameter x to denote the types of the borrowers.
5The speciﬁcation of risks can be interpreted as follows. Careful project management (¯ α)
means that the borrower takes necessary actions to make the project viable under adverse
circumstances in the economy. The idiosyncratic risk component reﬂects the fact that each
project may fail for reasons which are unrelated to management. This justiﬁes the existence
of markets for insurance policies.
6The private beneﬁt can be interpreted as shirking or, alternatively, as an opportunity
cost from careful project management. Since B is non-transferable, the social value of loan
contract with an eﬀort level ¯ α is higher than with α.
7The assumption that some banks have an advantage in monitoring certain clients
captures the feature that both geographical and informational specialization are important
aspects in small business lending. For instance, Nakamura (1994) suggests that small
banks have an organizational structure which contributes to a better ability to solve the
informational asymmetries inherent in lending. Further, DeYoung et al (2004) argue that
small banks’ ability to use of ‘soft information’ about small clients allows them to survive
the competition in the markets.
8For a similar modeling approach to specialization in ﬁnancial markets, see Almazan
(2002); Hauswald and Marquez (2002); and Kaas (2003).
10The geographical interpretation of the distance x1 is that the bank
1 pays travel cost to establish relationships with clients at diﬀerent
locations and for this it incurs a cost equal to tBx1. Once this cost
is sunk, the bank can monitor all clients at this speciﬁc location without
additional costs. The technological interpretation can be understood in
the following way: The bank’s ﬁnancial analysts are specialized in a
particular industry. To monitor diﬀerent types of industries, the banks’
analysts require speciﬁc skills. Therefore, it is plausible to think that the
more similar the producer is to the core industry of the bank the lower
the cost of acquiring these industry speciﬁc skills.
A feasible low-risk contract requires bank-monitoring to mitigate the
moral-hazard problem, because monitoring allows the bank to prevent
the realization of the private beneﬁt. A bank can accomplish this by
oﬀering a contract with suﬃciently low rate r(x) which induces the
borrower to accept a contract which speciﬁes an eﬀort ¯ α rather than
a contract without any speciﬁc requirements. Reﬂecting the individual
failure probabilities, a contract is referred to as high-risk and low-risk
contract when α = α and α =¯ α, respectively.
C4) Capital regulation: A bank supervisor can inﬂuence the credit market
through risk-based capital adequacy requirements applied to each bank.
These policies require a bank to hold [1 − π(α)]kB u n i t so fc a p i t a lp e r
contract in the form of liquid assets. The cost of capital is ρk >ρ s,
illustrating the property that although the capital can be invested in
safe assets, bank capital is costly. If there were no opportunity cost,
which will be denoted by ∆=ρk − ρs > 0, capital regulation would
not inﬂuence the banks’ investment behavior and regulation would be
meaningless.
The idea why capital adequacy requirements are important in
preventing the adverse market outcomes in banking is closely related to
Flannery (1989); Hellman, Murdock and Stiglitz (2000); and Holmström
and Tirole (1997). Minimum capital levels increase the cost the banks
incur in the case of credit default. The risk of loosing their own
money therefore makes the banks and, perhaps more importantly, their
shareholders more careful about the risks they are taking. In the
present model this shows up in increased monitoring of the borrowers
on behalf of the banks as higher capital adequacy requirements increase
the opportunity cost of monitoring.
After the initial investment funded through banks, a successful project yields
a stochastic payoﬀ until the end of the second period when all projects are
terminated. After the initial investment, a borrower with a successful project
thus has no need for additional capital, but has an incentive to obtain an
insurance policy to secure the consumption at the ﬁnal period. The insurers
enter the market and oﬀer insurance policies to successful borrowers. To
save on notation and without a loss of generality we assume that the actions
and the probabilities are identical to those in the case of the initial project.
11Other assumptions concerning the contracting environment between insurers
and borrowers are the following.
I1) Expected utility and insurance: At the beginning of period two,
the market consists of borrowers who have a successful initial project
and they have repaid their debt to the bank with interest. The project





(1 + ¯ π)ρr for α=¯ α
(1 + π)ρr + Bf o rα = α, (2.2)
where EUN(ρr,α) <E U N(ρr, ¯ α), reﬂecting the fact that an uninsured
individual will take an appropriate eﬀort to reduce the probability of






2ρr − pj for α=¯ α
2ρr + B − pj for α= α,
(2.3)
where pj is the premium charged by insurer j. The moral hazard
associated with insurance-contract emerges, because UI(ρr, ¯ α,pj) <
UI(ρr,α,p j) for any given pj.9
I2) Insurance contracts and monitoring: The insurer raises capital
in the form of premiums collected from policy-holders and invests the
capital to safe ﬁnancial asset ρs. They can condition the contract on the
eﬀort undertaken by the policy-holders and thereby reduce the moral
hazard. The monitoring technology is identical to that of the banks, but
the client speciﬁc monitoring cost is diﬀerent. That is, an insurer located
at 0 incurs a monitoring cost equal to tIx (tI  = tB) in the case of client
x. As is usual in insurance business, the insurer may incur losses even
for a monitored policy. However, we assume that the customer base 2M
is suﬃciently large so that the law of large number implies non-negative
expected proﬁt insofar as the insurers do not engage in underpricing the
contracts.
I3) Insurance regulation: The regulator can apply capital adequacy
regulation to the insurers. We assume that the requirement is risk-based,
ie each insurer is required to hold (1−π)ρrkI units of equity capital per
insurance contract until the contract expires at the end of second period.
The cost of capital is the same as in banking, thus, the opportunity cost
of holding capital is given by ∆=ρk − ρs > 0.
I4) Cost advantage of ﬁnancial conglomerates: Institutions combining
insurance and lending activities have an absolute cost advantage in
terms of monitoring insurance clients. More speciﬁcally, a ﬁnancial
9For the reasons of tractability, we assume full insurance contracts. The examination of
partial contracts would be interesting extension to the model, but it is beyond the scope of
the present study.
12conglomerate incurs no cost of monitoring an insurance client who
has established a credit relationship with the banking branch of the
institution.10
3 Stand-alone benchmark in insurance
This section characterizes the equilibria in stand-alone insurance market.
For simplicity, we consider a market conﬁguration with only two insurers
located on the opposite sides of the two-unit circumference, indicating that
the technological distance between the rival institutions is 1. The analysis
is in two steps: ﬁrst we consider the market for low-risk contracts and then
we examine the outcomes of the full game in which the institutions can also
oﬀer high-risk contracts. Given the market equilibrium in terms of pricing and
nature of existing contracts, we then investigate the role of capital adequacy
regulation in the allocation of risks within the market.
3.1 Monitoring in insurance-market
Once the borrowers’ future cash-ﬂows have been established, they can purchase
an insurance policy insulating their projects from shocks. Since the potential
policy holders can negotiate with an insurer for free, the insurers will engage in
Bertrand-type bidding competition for each potential customer individually.
The strategy for insurer j is a continuum of quotes combining a premium
pj and a monitoring eﬀort that implements a desired eﬀort level α.T h e
premium quote will be denoted by pj(xj) where xj denotes a distance between
a representative customer at location yj and the insurer j.
The services are considered homogeneous when both quotes require the
same eﬀort. Hence, limiting the insurers’ services to monitored policies implies
that the buyer chooses a policy with the lowest premium. The insurer 0’s

















¯ p0ρs − CI
0(kI,x 0)

for ¯ p0 =¯ p1
0 for ¯ p0 > ¯ p1
where CI
0(kI,x 0)=( 1− ¯ π)ρr(1 + kI∆) + tIx0. The constraint expresses the
feature that the customer chooses the policy with lower premium and when
the premiums are the same, the customer randomizes between the oﬀers. The
ﬁrst term in the insurer’s maximization problem is the return for the premiums
invested in safe assets. This return is realized at the end of the second period
10The assumption is rather extreme as it would be more plausible to think that the
conglomerates would incur just a lower, non-zero, monitoring cost. It should, however,
be noted that this would increase the notation without aﬀecting the main insights of the
analysis.
13when the insurer liquidates its assets in order to meet the claims. The second
term with a negative sign is the expected cost including the claim the insurer
has to meet at the end of the second period. The expected value of the claim
is increasing in the capital ratio kI, because the insurer is required to collect
the capital from the shareholders and hold it in a liquid form. The last term is
the monitoring cost the insurer incurs for a contract implementing an action
¯ α.
The insurer solves this problem in the case of each potential policy holder
observing the premiums the rival can feasibly oﬀer to the customer. In








1(kI,x 1) for x0 ∈ [0,1/2]
where x1 =1 − x0. This expression determines the equilibrium premium
in the case of each client who accepts the quote from insurer located at 0.
By symmetry, the insurer 1’s quotes are identical for customers located at
x0 ∈ [1/2,1].
The equilibrium strategy just derived is driven by that the insurer employs
local monopoly power over certain types of customers. The result can be
understood intuitively in the following way: The insurers observe the location
of the rival and therefore and the lowest premium the rival can feasibly oﬀer
to each potential client. Since the insurer located closer to the client has a
relative cost advantage in terms of monitoring the client, it sets its price just
marginally below the rival’s lowest feasible premium. It then follows that
accepted quotes are increasing in the distance between the customer and the
rival institution so that customers with the shortest distance to their insurer
end up paying the highest premiums. This emerges as equilibrium, because
the rival cannot match the oﬀer due to higher monitoring costs. The market
mechanism also implies that the cost advantages generated by specialization
do not pass on to the potential clients of the insurers, because the individuals
located further away from the insurers tend to receive more competitive quotes
from the institutions.
Substituting the equilibrium premiums into the insurers’ target functions




I (x0)=( 1− ¯ π)ρr(1 + k
I∆) + t
Ix1 − (1 − ¯ π)ρr(1 + k
I∆) − t
Ix0.
Rearranging and using the property that x0 =1−x1, we obtain the following
expression for the expected aggregate proﬁt for the insurers:
EV
0












14The proﬁt is strictly decreasing in the distance between the insurer and the
client, because the clients’ outside option becomes more attractive when the
rival institution is closer. The result thus shows that by specializing in a speciﬁc
sub-set of the potential clients the insurer obtains market power vis-à-vis its
rival which yields higher proﬁt for the insurer.
3.2 Characterization of the equilibrium in insurance
The analysis of the full game in the markets is in three steps. First, given the
optimal strategies derived in (3.1), we determine a quote for which a ﬁnancial
institution can feasibly sell contracts inducing an eﬀort level α as an alternative
to ones that require monitoring. Second, we illustrate an arbitrage condition
which determines whether the insurers can internalize the monitoring cost and
how it aﬀects the equilibrium results in (3.1). Finally, we show how capital
requirements can be used to inhibit the emergence of equilibrium outcomes
where monitored contracts do not survive the competition.
The potential collapse of markets for monitored insurance contracts is due
to the customers’ willingness to pay for a contract which allows for a lower eﬀort
level. When an insurer can oﬀer such contract with a suﬃciently low premium,
the quotes derived in (3.1) do not survive the competition. To formalize this
idea, let p =[ ( 1− π)ρr(1 + kI∆)]ρ−1
s denote the lowest admissible premium
for contracts IC[p,α] and consider two situations in which the emergence of
non-monitored contracts inﬂuences the equilibrium derived in the previous
section:
a) ∃¯ x0 ∈ [0,1/2] : ¯ p0∗(¯ x0)+B = p
b) ¯ x0 ∈ [0,1/2] : ¯ p0∗(¯ x0)+B<p
The two cases above are driven by an arbitrage condition which follows from
(2.3) and (3.1). Namely, when the price of a monitored contract is high enough,
the customer has a higher incentive to shop for non-monitored contracts. If
such contract can be provided at a feasible cost by the rival institution, they
will strike a deal at a premium p.I nc a s ea) this arbitrage condition implies
that quotes in (3.1) cannot be supported as an equilibrium, but the market
for monitored contracts does not collapse. In case b) the insurers cannot
internalize the costs of monitoring in the case of certain subset of clients.
These arguments can be understood in the following way: a) Suppose that
insurer 0 quotes ¯ p0∗(x0) to x0 ∈ [0,1/2]. Anticipating this, the insurer 1
captures the client’s business by oﬀering a high-risk contract with a premium
p1(x0)=¯ p0∗(¯ x0)+B.Substituting the cut-oﬀ premium, p,i n t op1(x0) and using
(3.1) we obtain the condition under which the insurer can feasibly design such
contract





15Solving for x0 we obtain a deﬁnition of the critical client for which the insurer







(¯ π − π)ρr(1 + k
I∆) − B

By symmetry, it is straightforward to see that when ¯ x0 ≥ 0, the contracts
derived in (3.1) do not constitute an equilibrium of the full game, because all
customers in the region x0 < ¯ x0(B,kI) accept high risk contract rather than
the one speciﬁed in (3.1). It is also worth noting that this result is more likely
to hold when the private beneﬁt is very large or the monitoring cost is high.
Consider then the optimal responses of insurer 0 which anticipates that
it cannot employ its local monopoly power in full, because some of the
potential clients rather accept the non-monitored contract. Since premiums
p0∗(x0) > ¯ p0∗(¯ x0) do not constitute an equilibrium for the subset of customers
satisfying x0 < ¯ x0(B,kI), the optimal strategy for the insurer 0 entails a
uniform premium independent of the distance. This premium just marginally
below ¯ p0∗(¯ x0), for each of these clients. For the remaining population, the
premium quotes coincide with the ones in (3.1). This result is illustrated in
Figure 1.
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Figure 1: p =¯ p0∗(¯ x0)+B
Figure 1 shows that when B is relatively low, the insurer specialized in
monitoring clients close to location 0 might not be able to employ its monopoly
power in full, because the rival can capture some of the clients with policies
which require no monitoring cost. This imposes downward pressure on insurer
0’s quotes and inhibits the emergence of equilibrium outcomes described in
(3.1).
Case (b): By similar lines of reasoning it is plausible to think that when
the private beneﬁt is high enough, the market for monitored contracts collapses
locally. To see this, suppose that CI
0[kI, ¯ x0(B,kI)]+B = p and ¯ x0(B,kI) < 1/2.
This indicates that the insurer 0 cannot internalize the cost of monitoring in
t h ec a s eo fc l i e n t sx0 > ¯ x0(B,kI). Thus, the market for monitored contracts
collapses in the region x0 ∈ [¯ x0(B,kI),1− ¯ x0(B,kI)], because the high private
beneﬁt or the cost of monitoring.
16The following Proposition summarizes these results:
Proposition 3.1 The equilibrium of the full game in stand-alone insurance
market is characterized by (3.1) and the following arbitrage condition: p ≷
CI
0(kI,1/2) + B :
(i) When p >C I
0(kI,1/2) + B, the market is fully covered by monitored
contracts. Each policy holder satisfying x0 < ¯ x0 < 1/2 will be charged a
premium ¯ p0∗(¯ x0)=p − B. Customers with x0 > ¯ x0 will be charged according
to (3.1).
(ii) When p > ¯ p0∗(1/2) + B, the market for monitored contracts collapses
in the case of clients x0 > ¯ x0,w h e r e¯ x0 satisﬁes CI
0(kI, ¯ x0)+B = p. Clients
x0 < ¯ x0 will accept monitored contracts with a premium p − B.
Proof. The proof follows the text.
This proposition states that the emergence of markets for monitored insurance
contracts depends on whether the insurers can internalize the cost of
monitoring and thereby oﬀer the contracts at a feasible rate to the customers
who would otherwise sign a less demanding contracts oﬀered by the rival.
In terms of the insurers’ risk exposures the feature that capital regulation
increases the cost of non-monitored contracts thus indicates the following:
Proposition 3.2 A capital adequacy requirement can be used to prevent
the emergence of non-monitored insurance contracts. Otherwise, capital
requirements only increase the premiums and diminish the policy holders’
welfare.
Proof. The property that appropriate kI implements an equilibrium where






ie keeping ¯ x0 as ﬁxed, higher kI increases the critical premium, p,f o rw h i c h
the insurers can feasibly oﬀer high-risk contracts. The increase is higher than
in the case of the lowest admissible price for low-risk contracts. Thus, there is
a kI∗ that implements an equilibrium in which each contract involves an eﬀort
level ¯ α premium ¯ p0∗(1/2) = p − B.
This result illustrates that when the insurers cannot internalize the costs, an
appropriate capital adequacy requirement can be used to induce monitoring,
because raising the requirement increases the insurers’ expected cost. This
eﬀect passes through to premiums in full, but it is lower in the case of
policies with lower probability of failure. Hence, by increasing the capital
adequacy requirement, the regulator can implement an equilibrium in which
IC[p,α] contracts will be replaced with contracts involving monitoring and
equal premiums for each policy-holder.
174 Banking equilibrium
This section investigates the markets for bank loans. For the reasons of
tractability the assumptions about the market structure are identical to those
in insurance. That is, we assume two banks, located on the opposite sides of
the technological circle. The ﬁrst subsection derives the equilibrium outcomes
in markets where the banks can only provide monitored loan contracts. The
second subsection examines whether the monitored loan contracts survive the
competition when the banks can also provide high risk contracts and discusses
the role of capital adequacy regulation in preventing excessive risk-taking in
banking.
4.1 Monitoring in banking
A strategy for a bank located at 0 is a continuum of loan contracts and interest
rates r(x0) charged by the bank 0 from a representative borrower x0. Hence,

















¯ r0¯ π − CB
0 (kB,x 0)

for r0 = r1
0 for r0 >r 1
where CB
0 (kB,x 0)=( 1− ¯ π)kb∆+ρs + tBx0. T h eﬁ r s tt e r mi nt h eb a n k ’ s
maximization problem is the expected revenue of the loan contract with a
probability of repayment given by ¯ π. The second term with a negative sign is
the cost the bank incurs from risk-based capital adequacy regulation, funding
the loans and monitoring the clients.
The bank sets its quote for each applicant on the basis of the location of








1 (kB,x 1) for x0 ∈ [0, 1
2]
The equilibrium contracts exhibit similar properties as in the insurance
markets: interest rates are higher for the loan applicants located closer to
the bank and the cost associated with capital adequacy regulation are passed
through to interest rates. Hence, the expected proﬁt per client for the bank is
a decreasing function of the distance between the client and the bank and the
aggregate proﬁt can be formalized as follows:
EV
0












18This expression indicates that the proﬁts of the banks are determined by the
diﬀerence in their monitoring technology. The applicants located at equal
distance from the banks get the most competitive quotes as banks engage in
tough price competition that eventually leads to zero margin for the bank from
which the customer accepts the quote.
4.2 Equilibrium in banking
Consider then the lowest admissible interest rate r =[ ( 1− π)kB∆+ρs]/π for
which a bank is willing to lend to a borrower without any speciﬁc requirements
on the eﬀort level. This rate is readily deﬁned by the expected zero-proﬁt
condition for the banks. Next, deﬁne a cut-oﬀ rate r1
c[¯ r0(x0)] for which the
borrowers are willing to accept a riskier contract rather than a monitored one












c[¯ r0(x0)] > ¯ r0(x0).S i n c e r1
c[¯ r0(x0)] is the highest rate the customers
are willing to accept as an alternative to ¯ r0(x0), the existence of market for





This expression states that when the quote for monitored loan contract is high
enough, the bank 1 can quote a non-monitored contract which will be accepted
by some borrowers.
In equilibrium the nature of contracts oﬀered in the market thus depends
on the monitoring costs and on the borrowers’ willingness to pay for
non-monitored contracts which essentially determine whether the banks can
internalize the monitoring cost. The following proposition and Figures 4
and 5 examine the equilibrium outcomes and the role of capital adequacy
requirements in more detail.
Proposition 4.1 The equilibrium in the loan markets can be characterized
using the following (exogenous) arbitrage condition: r1
c[CB




0 (kB,1/2)] ≤ r, the market will be covered by low-risk
contracts. Each borrower x0 ≤ ¯ x0, where ¯ x0 < 1/2 satisﬁes r1
c[¯ r0∗(¯ x∗
0)] = r,w i l l
be charged ¯ r0∗(¯ x∗




0 (kB,1/2)] >r , the market for low-risk contracts collapses
locally, because borrowers x0 > ¯ x0,w h e r e¯ x0 < 1/2 satisﬁes r1
c[CB
0 (kB, ¯ x0)] = r,
will not be monitored. Each borrower x0 < ¯ x0 will be charged an interest rate
¯ r0(¯ x0) and the more distant borrowers will accept a high risk contract with
interest rate r.
Proof. The proof follows the text and therefore it is omitted.
19The result derives from that the loan contracts are substitutes, but a
non-monitored contract allows the borrowers a private beneﬁt. The aggregate
risk exposure in the credit market thus depends on whether the banks can
internalize the monitoring costs and provide loan contracts at an acceptable
rate to the borrowers. When the cost of monitoring or the private beneﬁt is
high, the banks are unlikely to accomplish this. Consequently, there will be
a segment of borrowers who will not be oﬀered low risk contracts. Figure 2
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Figure 2
The collapse of markets for low risk contracts may constitute an externality
as the aggregate default risk in the market is higher and the banks are subject
to higher risk of insolvency.11 The regulator can correct for the externality
through capital adequacy requirements:
Proposition 4.2 There is a capital adequacy requirement giving raise to an
equilibrium in which all borrowers accept a monitored contract with a ﬁxed
interest rate ¯ r0∗(1/2).















The mechanism through which capital regulation inﬂuences the market
outcome is illustrated Figure 3. A higher kB increases the cost of high risk
contract relative to that of low risk one. This diminishes the competitive
pressures imposed by low risk contracts and helps the banks to internalize the
monitoring costs, indicating that an appropriate capital requirement can be
11The prediction that the markets for low risk loans in the case of applicants whose projects
are more distant to the bank is not implausible. For instance, Acharya et al (2004) report
that lending expansion into new or competitive industries contributes to higher level of risk
in banks’ loans.
20used to implement an equilibrium in which only monitored loan contracts are
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To see the importance of capital requirements, consider the case (ii) in
Proposition 3, in which the expected proﬁt for bank 0 can be written as
EV
0






where the second term on the RHS expresses the risk the bank is exposed when
it gambles with non-monitored loan contracts. That is, with a probability
(1 − ω) all non-monitored projects will default, and for this the bank incurs
credit default losses equal to (1 − 2¯ x0)[(1 − π)kB∆+ρs]. The regulator can,
however, use the capital adequacy regulation to correct for this externality by
imposing capital requirement which diminishes the number of risky loans. In
particular, the risk of insolvency disappears when kB is such that ¯ x0 =1 /2.
5 Financial conglomerates
In the present model the emergence of ﬁnancial conglomerates means that
an institution combining both ﬁnancial activities has a cost advantage in
monitoring the clients with whom it has an established relationship. The
key in understanding the eﬀects of ﬁnancial conglomeration on the eﬃciency
of the ﬁnancial markets depends on the following aspects: the eﬀect of
conglomeration on the institutions’ monopoly power vis-à-vis their clients in
both upstream and downstream markets, and the eﬀect on the institutions’
incentives to internalize the monitoring costs required to provide low-risk
contracts. In what follows, these aspects will be analyzed in a similar manner
as in the case of stand-alone institutions and the results will be established by
comparing the market outcomes.
Before moving in to the analysis it is important to note that we do not
analyze the emergence of ﬁnancial conglomerates. Rather, we consider the
market outcomes after the conglomeration has taken place in the form of
21mergers or acquisitions. This means that the number of active service providers
in each market is the same as in the stand-alone case. In the concluding
section we discuss the potential business strategies which explain ﬁnancial
conglomeration in the present framework.
5.1 Equilibrium in insurance market
Consider two institutions located at 0 and 1, each of which has a group of
existing clients with an established credit relationship. To ﬁx ideas, denote
these groups of clients as X0 and X1, and assume that the loan contracts have
been monitored at the previous stage of the game. We can then formalize
the cost advantage associated with conglomeration by letting δ(xj) denote a
dummy variable taking values δ(xj)=1and δ(xj)=0for xj ∈ X0 and
xj ∈ X1, respectively.
Given the deﬁnition of the cost-structure and letting EV 0
IC(x0) denote the
expected proﬁt of the insurance proﬁt of the conglomerate 0, the maximization
















˜ p0ρs − CIC
0 (kI,x 0)

for p0 = p1
0 for p0 >p 1
where CIC
0 (kI,x 0)=δ(x0)tIx0+(1−¯ π)ρr(1+kI∆). The conglomerate observes
the cost structure of its rival and solves this problem in the case of each
potential client. Hence, the equilibrium quotes are essentially the same as
in the case of stand-alone institutions: the optimal quote for an insurer with
a cost advantage in monitoring is just marginally below the feasible premium
of the rival.
In equilibrium, the policy holders accept the quote insofar it is below the
one oﬀered by the rival. If the customer is an existing client of conglomerate
0, the rival has to internalize the cost of monitoring, tIx1. Hence, the solution








1 (kI,x 1) for x1 ∈ X0
where x1 denotes the distance between customer x and insurer 1.
The expression (5.1) readily shows that the equilibrium quotes resemble
those in (3.1), but the insurers’ expected payoﬀ depends on the predetermined
customer-base of each institution. To see this, substitute (5.1) into the insurers
target function and let ˜ x0 ∈ X0 denote the customer with the longest distance


















The analysis shows immediately that the insurance proﬁts are higher for
conglomerates, because they incur lower operational costs with their existing
customers:
Remark 5.1 The cost-eﬃciency gains imply that ﬁnancial conglomerates
have higher proﬁt in the insurance market than stand-alone insurers.
This remark summarizes the result that conglomeration does not improve
the eﬃciency in the insurance markets, because the cost advantages will pass
directly in to insurers’ price-cost mark-up. Hence, in order to illustrate the
competitive implications of ﬁnancial conglomeration, it remains to consider
the equilibrium in banking when the conglomerates recognize the potential for
additional proﬁt when designing the loan contracts.
5.2 Banking equilibrium
A conglomerate bank observes that each successful loan will yield them an
additional proﬁt in terms of insurance policies and set their quotes accordingly.
The problem of conglomerate 0 is thus to maximize the combined expected




















˜ r0¯ π − CB
0 (kB,x 0)+¯ πV 0
I (xj)

for r0 = r1
0 for r0 >r 1
where CB
0 (kB,x 0)=( 1 − ¯ π)kb∆+ρs + tBx0 is the cost function of the
conglomerate 0’s banking branch. Expression ¯ πV 0
IC(xj) denotes the expected
proﬁt for the bank when it captures the customer’s downstream insurance
business.
The equilibrium quote that conglomerate 0 proposes to a customer x0, is
just below the rival’s oﬀer insofar as it yields a non-negative long-term proﬁt.
To see how the insurance proﬁt aﬀects the pricing of banking services, observe
that V 1
IC(xj)=CIC
0 (kI,x 0) which indicates that the insurance proﬁt of the
additional banking customer for institution 1 equals the cost eﬃciency gain
23the rival obtains from extending its services to insurance. This pro-competitive
eﬀect thus induces the banking branches to reduce their rates below the one in
(4.1), because they conjecture that adding customers to the client-base yields
an additional insurance proﬁt:
Lemma 5.2 Let ¯ r0∗(x0) and ˜ r0∗(x0) denote the interest rate of the stand-alone
and conglomerate bank located at 0, respectively. The accepted contracts in
the credit market involve lower interest rates than in the case of stand-alone
institutions. The reduction in the rates equals the cost reduction expected in
insurance, i.e. ¯ r0∗(x0) − ˜ r0∗(x0)=¯ πtIx0.
Proof. By a Bertrand-type argument, the conglomerate oﬀers a contract
involving rate r(x) a n da ne ﬀ o r t¯ α. The rate is just below the admissible oﬀer
















[(1 − ¯ π)k
B∆+t
B(1 − x0) − ¯ πt
Ix0] (5.2)
Next, observe that for x0 < 1/2 the conglomerate 0 has an absolute cost
advantage in monitoring and will set its price according to the rule r0 = r1
a−ε.





[(1 − ¯ π)k
B∆+t
B(1 − x0) − ¯ πt
Ix0].
Using (4.1) it is clear that ¯ r0∗(x0) − ˜ r0∗(x0)=¯ πtIx0
This result illustrates that the conglomerates have an incentive to lower their
quotes so as to capture a higher number of potential insurance customers.
However, since both institutions have the same conjecture, this anticipated
gain does not materialize ex-post. The failed attempt to increase the customer
base imposes downward pressure on interest rates, reducing the proﬁt in
banking. Hence, the long-run proﬁts for the conglomerates are given by
V
0














This indicates that the proﬁt of a ﬁnancial conglomerate equals the combined
expected proﬁt of a stand-alone insurer and a bank. Since the interest rates
in the credit market are lower, but the insurance premiums are the same, it is
straightforward to see that the market eﬃciency in terms of pricing and the
utility of the borrowers increases:
24Proposition 5.3 Financial conglomeration intensiﬁes the competition in
banking. Consequently, the interest rates are lower inducing higher payoﬀ
for the borrowers and lower proﬁt in the banking business. Although the
reduced proﬁt in banking will be compensated in the insurance market, the
aggregate proﬁt in the industry does not change, because the cost eﬃciency
gains are passed on to the borrowers. Therefore, the emergence of ﬁnancial
conglomerates indicates a Pareto-improvement in welfare.
The results just derived establish that the proﬁt-margin for the banking-branch
of a ﬁnancial conglomerate is lower than that of a stand-alone institution.
The reason is that the potential for additional proﬁt in the insurance market
induces the conglomerates to quote lower interest rates so as to capture the
customers’ insurance business, indicating that the cost-eﬃciency gains tend
to pass through to the credit market in full. For the conglomerates, the
increase in proﬁt is realized in the insurance market which compensates the
lower proﬁt associated with tougher competition in the credit market. As a
result, the cost-eﬃciency gains associated with conglomeration will result in a
more eﬃcient market environment in terms of pricing the monitored services.
5.3 The regulation of ﬁnancial conglomerates
Having illustrated the equilibrium outcomes in the markets for monitored
ﬁnancial contracts, we can now analyze whether the emergence of ﬁnancial
conglomerates aﬀects the allocation of risk in the markets and the eﬀectiveness
of capital adequacy requirements in preventing the collapse of markets for
monitored contracts. Consider ﬁrst the insurance market in the presence of
ﬁnancial conglomerates and recall that the insurers can support the equilibrium
premiums described in (5.1), provided that they can internalize the cost of
monitoring of a client for which the rival oﬀers a high-risk contract at a rate
p. By similar lines of reasoning as in Proposition 1, the conglomerates can
feasibly internalize the monitoring cost in the case of existing clients, because
the monitoring costs are zero for this subset of clients. It then follows that each
customer with a monitored loan contract will be oﬀered an insurance policy
specifying an eﬀort level ¯ α:
Proposition 5.4 Suppose that each successful project has been monitored by a
banking branch of a ﬁnancial conglomerate. Then the equilibrium premiums in
the insurance market coincide with the ones in Proposition 1. However, each
policy involves monitoring and (weakly) lower aggregate risk of failures than in
stand-alone markets. Hence, capital adequacy requirements are not required to
limit the number of non-monitored insurance contracts.
Proof. The proof follows immediately from that the insurer has already
incurred the cost of monitoring. Hence, absent capital regulation the lowest
premium the insurer can feasibly oﬀer for the existing clients is ¯ p =( 1−
¯ π)ρr. For the high-risk contract the zero-proﬁt premium is p =( 1− π)ρr.B y
expressions (2.2) and (2.3) we infer that at these prices, the customers also
prefer the low risk contract.
25The result indicates that the emergence of ﬁnancial conglomerates generates a
link between a prudential behavior in banking and risk exposures in insurance.
That is, when the ﬁnancial conglomerate has already incurred the cost of
monitoring, it can capture the existing customers’ insurance business through
undercutting the rivals’ oﬀers. Hence, the aggregate risk in the market for
insurance policies is diminished, making the capital adequacy regulation less
important in insurance.
The result is arguably extreme in that we assume zero cost of monitoring
the existing client. The basic idea, however, carries over under weaker
assumptions about the cost eﬃciency gains. For instance, if the cost reductions
involved lower, yet positive, cost of monitoring, the market equilibrium would
exhibit higher eﬃciency, because more insurance contracts would be monitored
than in stand-alone markets.
In what comes to banking, Proposition 5 gives a new perspective on the
industrial organization implications of ﬁnancial conglomeration. When the
banks extend their product line to insurance, they have an additional incentive
to monitor the loan contracts. From the regulators’ viewpoint this means that
the capital adequacy requirements targeted to implement a certain aggregate
level of risk in the market should be lower. The reason is that identical
allocation of risk can be obtained with lower requirement which would impose
lower deadweight loss in the credit market:
Proposition 5.5 After ﬁnancial conglomeration, the banks have increased
incentives to monitor their clients. Hence, capital adequacy requirements aimed
to implement equilibrium with a speciﬁc allocation of risks between borrowers
should be lower than in the case of stand-alone institutions.
Proof. The proof follows immediately from expression (5.2). The reason
why capital adequacy requirements are ineﬃcient when the regulator does not
recognize the cost-eﬃciency gains is that the cost of regulation passes into
interest rates in full. Thus, by reducing the requirement the regulator can
implement an equilibrium in which ¯ xc
0(kB
c )=¯ x0(kB
s ), where kB
c <k B
s denote
the capital adequacy requirements in conglomerate and stand alone markets,
respectively.
This result compares the market outcomes between stand-alone and
conglomerate markets, and claims that in the presence of ﬁnancial
conglomerates the credit market is less fragile. The reason is that the
conglomerates have a greater incentive to provide monitored contracts than
stand-alone institutions, because the conglomerates perceive the business
relationship more valuable. This relationship component is not a factor in the
high risk contracts and stand-alone banking, indicating that conglomerates
are more likely to internalize the cost of monitoring to counter the competitive
pressures imposed by high risk contracts oﬀered by their rivals. As a result,
more borrowers will be monitored which mitigates the market failure associated
with an increased risk of bank insolvency.
The policy implications of the improved market eﬃciency are
straightforward. If there was a perceived ‘optimal’ allocation of high and
low risk contracts in stand-alone markets, the higher market eﬃciency would
26allow the regulators to implement this allocation with lower capital adequacy
requirements. Lower requirements diminish the deadweight loss of regulation
by reducing the costs of producing loan contracts and interest rates in the
credit market.
6 Conclusion
The aim of this paper was to examine the implications of the emergence
of institutions combining credit and insurance services in ﬁnancial markets.
To this end we developed model providing a speciﬁc example of industrial
organization aspects of synergies motivating ﬁnancial conglomeration. This
model was then employed to investigate the implications of ﬁnancial
conglomeration on market eﬃciency in terms of allocation of risk and pricing
of ﬁnancial services.
Since we were interested in the performance of two diﬀerent organizational
arrangements in ﬁnancial markets, we ﬁrst analyzed a stand-alone benchmark
in which institutions provide a single service for each customer and compared
the results with the market outcomes which obtain when the ﬁnancial
institutions combine these services. In addition to solving for the market
equilibria in both cases, we showed that capital adequacy requirements can
be used to limit the institutions’ insolvency risk generated by moral hazard in
both markets.
The stand-alone equilibrium exhibited the following properties. First,
specialization in monitoring certain types of clients allows the banks and
the insurers to employ a local monopoly power over a subset of customers.
Higher monopoly rents, however, induce the rival institutions to oﬀer riskier
contracts. The emergence of such contracts reduces the number of projects
that have a higher success probability thus increasing the number of potential
failures of investment projects in the economy. The regulator can mitigate
the institutions’ risk-taking by imposing minimum capital requirements which
increase the expected cost of non-monitored contracts.
Induced by the expected proﬁt in the downstream insurance market, the
conglomerates have a greater incentive to establish a credit relationship with
the potential borrowers. This eﬀect shows up in tougher competition for clients
in the credit market as the institutions have increased incentives to internalize
the cost of monitoring which diminishes the aggregate risk in the market. The
borrowers beneﬁt from the improved market eﬃciency, because lower cost of
bank ﬁnancing increases the borrowers’ income and reduces the insolvency
risks in the market. In particular, the analysis shows that in the presence of
ﬁnancial conglomerates, the regulator can implement the desired allocation of
risk with capital adequacy requirements with lower deadweight loss than in
the case of stand-alone institutions.
From the ﬁnancial institutions’ viewpoint the gains associated with
conglomeration might be markedly high ex-ante, indicating that in a
game where the ﬁnancial institutions choose their strategies in terms of
organizational arrangements, a stand-alone structure would be a strictly
27dominated strategy. However, the unintended consequence of ﬁnancial
conglomeration is that the institutions cannot capitalize on the economies of
scope ex-post. This is because when trying to establish long term relationships
with borrowers, the competition becomes more intense in the credit markets
diminishing the proﬁt of the institutions. The example in this paper makes
this point clear by showing that the aggregate proﬁt in the ﬁnancial sector is
the same regardless of the institutions organizational forms. Hence, it is not
implausible to think that the long-term proﬁt of a ﬁnancial conglomerate is
lower than the combined proﬁt of two separate ﬁnancial institutions, especially
when there are costs involved with the re-organization of the institutions or
costly frictions in combining the services.
It is worth pointing out that this result is not limited to cases in which
banks are allowed to extend their business lines into insurance through mergers
and acquisitions. On the contrary, the pro-competitive eﬀect would become
stronger if both the insurers and the banks extended their product lines,
because the number of active institutions in the markets would increase.
This is one direction to which the present study could be extended. In
particular, the model does not consider the institutional design aspects of
ﬁnancial conglomeration and assumed that the customers of the ﬁnancial
institutions are myopic in that they do not recognize the consequences of the
initial ﬁnancial contract on the contracting environment in the downstream
insurance markets. Thus, a potential extension to the model would analyze
the outcomes of a game where stand-alone institutions have the option extend
their product lines in the presence of forward looking customers.
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